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[This is a rather crude and early draft of a paper for submission to a conference.  It is 
under-referenced and unfinished.  For those reasons, please do not quote without my 
permission and please provide any comments to help it along]. 
 
 
 
“Too often, what everyone believes, nobody knows.” 
     Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis, p. 12 
 
Globalization seems more believed than known, somewhat tacit and no less 
powerful for that.  It seems to have outgrown status as a metaphor, but not yet arrived at 
the twin graveyards of clear and distinct ideas and fixed, lexical meaning.  Like other “-
ized” terms, it can signify either (or both) transitivity or intransitivity; that is, it can 
produce understanding and interpretation of either actions or of states of affairs, agency 
or structure for example.  One can “globalize” (perform globalization) or globalization 
can simply be a way of understanding the nature of things.  Such indeterminacy is at the 
core of moral and political questions about human agency and responsibility for 
globalization.  Globalization in the context of agency is grounded hermeneutically in 
what “-Izers” do, as one might, for example, “globalize” production.  In the context of 
structures, globalization has primarily objective sense and reference as, for example, one 
might speak of electronically interconnected systems of capital exchange. It seems to me 
that globalization poses critical-theoretic difficulties in large part because of this 
ambiguity embedded within the term itself.  “-Izers” (agents) may or may not be at work; 
and, even if they are, critical evaluation of their work must fight through the ontological 
fog of drawing agency out of the “state of things”  (structures) – a poststructural classic. 
Complex social phenomena, like globalization, blur distinctions between 
structures and human agency (see Giddens, 2001).   If inquiry into such phenomena seeks 
to provide insights and guidance about human possibilities, like for example “managing,” 
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then grappling with the indeterminacy of social processes in which structure and agency 
are blurred seems preferable to pretending that things are rather clear.  Granting 
structures too much credit leads easily to a rather fatalistic array of guidance – live with 
the structure, manage within the structure, etc.  Granting agency too much credit avoids 
the fatalism but pays the price of romanticism -- persons cannot simply override social 
structures because they can imagine or remember how things once were.  Globalization, 
whatever it might be, seems paradigmatic of this setting.  Powerful and often brutal 
structures like hyper-mobile global financial capital carry with them imperatives for 
particular kinds of agency; and, with that, agency faces the problem of ensuring that 
moral-political horizons are preserved from within those structures.1 That requires 
imagination -- political, moral, economic, cultural, and social imagination.  This essay is 
a thought experiment in how to imagine the relation between globalization, accounting, 
and the imaginative potential of meaning as a possibility for “managing things.” 
 
Globalizations 
I will follow Bartelson’s (2000) conceptual reckoning of the term globalization.  
Bartelson suggests that the conceptual history of the concept of globalization finds itself 
in an “ontological interregnum,” as it transgresses the “stratification and 
compartmentalization of the world” on which social scientific thought and practice has 
come to depend.  Bartelson explains: 
Today few doubt the reality of globalization, yet no one seems to know with any 
certainty what makes globalization real.  So while there is no agreement about 
what globalization is, the entire discourse on globalization is founded on a quite 
solid agreement that globalization is (2000, p. 180). 
 
A shift from the “what is” to the “that is” of globalization moves us somewhat away from 
conventional rationales of the social sciences, rationales like “…the desire to purge 
scientific discourse of ambiguity by stipulating connotations through clear cut 
definitions” (ibid., p. 181).  This desire is a well-rehearsed one, with origins in Cartesian 
valorization of the “clear and distinct,” analytic valorization of exactitude in language, 
                                                 
1 If financial capital is globally mobile, then so is physical capital.  That mobility opens 
the critical space for preserving legitimate concerns with modern processes like control of 
the labor process.  I thank my colleague Bill Brown for this insight. 
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and social scientific emulation of the methods of modern natural science.2  Though of 
course the modern division of the social sciences and the ontological presuppositions on 
which it is based give rise to credible knowledge about economies, organizations, 
international relations, etc., something nonetheless seems amiss as we speak of and sense 
the desire for something other than our conventional ways of knowing as we confront  
our belief that globalization is.  For Bartelson, the idea of globalization today 
… functions both as a ‘space of experience’ as well as a ‘horizon of expectation’:  
a space of experience insofar as it draws upon and incorporates elements from 
modern social ontology; a horizon of expectation insofar as it contains an implicit 
promise to transcend modernity proper and the strictures it imposes on political 
imagination (Bartelson, p. 183, as adapted from Koselleck’s (1985) terminology). 
 
Bartelson’s argument is based on three different ways in which the term 
globalization can be conceptualized – as transference, as transformation, and as 
transcendence.  The first two fit well with conventional understandings of social 
ontology and social science, as they are embedded in the familiar categories of states, 
organizations, nations, etc.  Bartelson offers the third term, transcendence, in the spirit of 
something like a critical imaginary, an invitation to think with but beyond conventional 
understandings.  Each offers its own critical potential, though moving through them takes 
us from the comfort of convention to more challenging confrontations with intelligibility 
and accessibility.  Meeting that challenge does, for him, open more space for political 
imagination and critical potential.   I will briefly present Bartelson’s three concepts and 
suggest the critical potential embedded in each of them.   
 
Globalization as transference 
A language of transference positions globalization in the conventional form of 
identifiable entities (states, corporations) interacting in a way that does not alter the 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, in his insightful text Cosmopolis, Stephen Toulmin explains how the 
forerunner of globalization, a cosmopolitianism at the originary core of Modernity, 
shared this same desire.  Toulmin suggests that we would have been much better off if 
the fruitful texts of the sixteenth-century humanists had not been eclipsed.  Perhaps it’s 
not too late. 
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identities of the entities themselves in any ontologically significant manner.  Bartelson 
explains: 
Perhaps the first and most common sense of globalization is that of globalization 
as an intensified transference or exchange of things between preconstituted units, 
be they political, economic or cultural.  Thus conceived, globalization signifies a 
process of change that originates at the level of the unit, mainly in terms of the 
unintended consequences of the interaction between units.  Globalization as 
transference thus implies exchange across existing unit boundaries and between 
units and system, but it still presupposes that this system as well as the units 
remain identical with themselves throughout the globalizing process.” (p. 184). 
 
 The hermeneutical key here is no different from that which anchors understanding 
of terms like “internationalization,” “multinational” corporations or trade, or “federalism” 
inasmuch as the unit (the state, the firm, the agent) remains the ontological anchor for 
understanding.  Globalization as transference can of course explain how the power of 
units/agents moves from the “inside out” and thus becomes an object for moral 
assessment and reaction from outside its own boundaries. This view, for example, 
provides potential for continuing and important inquiry into imperialism, economic and 
environmental exploitation, and other ways in which social machinery acts upon others in 
the name of the unit itself.  But the discourse remains such that “…globalization may well 
affect the attributes of states [or other units], yet without changing their basic identity or 
fundamentally disrupting their capacity to act” (Bartelson, p. 185; insert mine).  
Globalization at best becomes a derivative term sharing the semantic and pragmatic space 
with terms like international, multinational, and multicultural, losing its imaginative 
potential now encrusted in theories and worldviews that have been around for a long, 
long time and that make “…locality the condition of possible globality” (ibid., p. 185). 
 
Globalization as transformation 
A second construal – globalization as transformation – decenters units as it 
attends to the manner in which systems spread across and not just within units such that 
the functionality of systems is of less interest than is the generative capacity of such 
systems to change the nature of the units themselves.  Bartelson explains: 
If globalization is understood in the first concept as a process of interaction and 
transference between pre-existing units, the second concept does much to reverse 
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this picture:  in this sense, globalization is a process of transformation that occurs 
at the systems level, and it affects this system as much as it affects the identity of 
the units.  
 
Globalization takes place over and above the units as a result of the interaction 
between systemic variables across different dimensions and sectors of that 
system.  Thus, globalization is by definition a multidimensional process that takes 
place outside in.  To the extent that this process involves the units, it does so by 
turning them into reproductive circuits for those systemic processes and forces 
which ultimately alter their identity and, eventually, the constitutive rules of the 
system in which they are situated.” (pp. 186-187). 
 
 Globalization as transformation finds its conceptual center in systems and 
structures which act upon units and agents in ways which change their shape and 
character.  Perhaps the best example is the force of structural economic imperatives 
within global capitalism to turn the state (and indeed corporations) into “… executors and 
plenipotentiaries of forces which they have no hope of controlling politically” (Bauman, 
1998, p. 65 as cited in Bartelson, p.188).  In other words, capital doesn’t go through 
customs; it bounces off of satellites.  State legitimacy demands transformation of the state 
from a modern welfare state that contains the private sector and extracts resources to 
secure the natural rights of citizens into a functionary within the private sector obligated 
to facilitate economic efficiency as a structural imperative, for the most part irrespective 
of “rights” or any other moral term.  Thus while the “units” of conventional social 
science remain in place, their identities and actions are altered because of processes and 
structures attributed to the “global,” to something outside of themselves.  While 
transference works from “the inside out” of the units, transformation works from “the 
outside  in.” 
 
Globalization as transcendence 
Bartelson’s third term, transcendence, always makes me a bit nervous.  Laudable 
as an appeal to social and political imaginaries, it is perhaps better understood as a way of 
saying something like “the old words and paradigms have seen better days; by 
transcendence we mean to look for new ones, to imagine radical difference.”  That sense 
of breaking through into a domain of newness is the central idea in Bartelson’s notion of 
globalization as transcendence: 
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Thus far we have stayed within the limits defined by the ontology of the social 
sciences, within a world that comes stratified into units and systems and 
compartmentalized into sectors of human thought and action.  … 
 
So what takes place beyond this world can only be rendered transparent in new 
terms.  The most recent set of connotations soaked up by the concept of 
globalization promises to escape the strictures of modern social thought by 
defying the standard ontologization of the world into units and system and by 
disputing its compartmentalization into sectors or dimensions.  Thus understood, 
globalization implies the transcendence of those distinctions that together 
condition unit, system and dimension identity.  Globalization is neither inside out 
nor outside in but rather a process that dissolves the distinction between inside 
and outside.” (p. 189).  
 
Though Bartelson and others perhaps overly romanticize this concept – treating it 
as something of an intellectual ticket into a brave new world where “states die” and “total 
emancipation” finds the door open, globalization as transcendence “. . . despatializes and 
detemporalizes human practices as well as the conditions of human knowledge, and it 
projects them onto the global as a condition of its existence.  Thus conceived, 
globalization is driven forward by a dynamic of its own and is irreducible to singular 
causes within particular sectors or dimensions” (p. 189).  At the ontological level, 
transcendence represents a linguistic turn such that discursive practices and flows of 
information replace social units and agents as the primary objects of inquiry into 
globalization.  
 To summarize, whatever the weaknesses, Bartelson responds elegantly to begin to 
remedy the specific elusiveness of the concept of globalization.  By my lights, if 
globalization is to be understood as transference we would be better off without the term.  
In the context of semantic and pragmatic meaning, the term adds nothing to what we can 
already glean from a focus on the international, the multinational, or even the 
transnational.  And, because the term globalization is socially, politically, and morally 
less transparent than these other terms, it carries less potential for critical assessment of 
agents and their actions.  For example, a capitalist or a corporation who has the financial 
and political power to work from “the inside out” on others can attribute the 
consequences of agency to the ephemeral domain of “globalization,” thus deflecting 
moral attention away from agency and onto the rather amoral domain of systemic 
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imperatives.  “The world as my oyster”3 flows smoothly from the mouth of this sense of 
globalization.  Further, at the level of critical inquiry, rich and critically productive 
theoretical and empirical resources are available within the domains of the international, 
the multinational, and the transnational that become less specific to agency and thereby 
less effective as critical resources when embedded in a discourse of globalization (see, for 
example, Stiglitz 2002).  
Globalization as transformation garners semantic and pragmatic import inasmuch 
as it brings political economy back into focus.  Units like states and organizations are 
altered in their identities and their functions as they become embedded within systems, 
structures, and processes that overcome the modern fragmentation of the political and the 
economic into autonomous units of inquiry.  The ability of states (and organizations) to 
treat concepts like the rights of citizenship as if they were sovereign over economic 
imperatives and could “contain” those imperatives is weakened, and there is much critical 
potential in reconfiguring the nature of states and governmentality to a concept that 
matches what that nature is in a globalized world – these units are of necessity primarily 
functionaries within the apparati of global capital.  
 Globalization as transcendence may be overly romanticized, but it does sharply 
turn the social science of globalization toward language and away from some rather stale 
modern categories of place and time.  This has both descriptive legitimacy and critical 
promise.  A globalized world is better described through flows of information than in 
terms of modern interplays between institutions and agents.  One ubiquitous and 
powerful medium embedded in the meaning of globalization is accounting – a discourse 
and a set of practices which contains both the structure and the agency of global capital 
and which is legally recognized as the “master” discourse of global political economy.  It 
is itself an “-Ization” of particular note. 
 
Accountingizations 
 
                                                 
3 My own anecdotal conclusion from conversations with American business persons (and 
business professors) is that this is precisely what globalization means to them, coded as 
that message might be. 
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Some scholars refer to “accountingization” to describe ways in which 
organizations – public and private alike – now give more of the discursive floor to the 
conventional discourse of accounting – its financial lexicon; its functional grammar; its 
control capacities, its economic calculi, its particular logic, and its auditability (see Power 
and Laughlin, 1992; Broadbent and Laughlin, 1994, 1997; Hood, 1995).  Because of its 
functionality within an axiology (a value-space) committed to economic efficiency and 
capitalist ideology, accounting neatly folds itself into the underdetermined ethical and 
political comportments of globalization.  In this sense, accountingization can be 
understood to “delinguistify” a range of ethical, social, and political aspects of the 
experiences of globalization, reductively translating them into a language of economic 
efficiency and profitability.  Indeed, if globalization as transformation is to commit to 
flows of information exchange as the heir to conventional units of analysis, then 
accounting stands as what might be termed the “master discourse” of globalization.  It is 
a vivid reminder of the risk we face in underplaying the ease with which the structural 
imperatives toward efficiency and profitability “trump” (or colonize) our more humane 
linguistic practices in legal and quasi-legal discourse throughout the globe. 
Accountingization emerges from four historical developments that have enhanced 
the significance of accounting to everyday contemporary life.  The first is the collapse of 
planned economies in the past three decades, a collapse that made capitalism overtly 
global.  As the legally-mandated language for the financial regulation of capital; and, 
irrespective of whether or not such regulation is directly under the control of 
governments, the expansion of capitalistic accounting forces the hegemony of a particular 
calculus, lexicon, and grammar into a global organizational and political context.  That 
hegemony can work in an imperial way through the expansion of Western multinationals 
or it can work in an originary way as emerging organizations commit themselves to 
Western accounting, often with the prodding of transnational agencies like the World 
Bank, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
The second historical development to enhance the accountingization of things is 
the technology-induced efficiencies and growth in the production of and dissemination of 
information, best evidenced through the Internet.  This makes accounting more salient in 
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at least three ways.  First, from an organizational perspective, elaborate systems (e.g., 
SAP©) are built around the structural features of conventional accounting systems.  The 
“account” is the nominative lynchpin of such systems.  The difference now is that 
accounting entries can rather costlessly proliferate into a seemingly endless array of 
financial representations and documents, putatively facilitating managerial decisions, 
regulatory reporting, and control processes.  Because time and attention are scarce 
resources, such proliferation colonizes or squeezes out other modes of organizational 
discourse.  The second way in which accounting gains salience through information 
systems results from the interaction of information technology and the despatialization of 
work, a despatialization made possible by both transitions toward a “service” economy as 
well as a globally fluid market for the production of goods.  The uncoupling of work 
from “place” and “time” gives accounting more room to do one of the things that it has 
always been good at – control “at a distance.”  The third and more nuanced way in which 
information systems enhance accounting has to do with the need at some point to reduce 
the polysemy of meaning that comes from growth in information to a “master” or 
“official” discourse of the organization.  In this sense, accounting solves a “translation” 
problem as it forces the specialized discourses of various organizational functionaries 
into its own lexicon, calculus, grammar and structure – most noticeably “the bottom 
line.”  Accounting has always, in an often rather grossly reductionistic way, functioned as 
a translation apparatus.  The difference now is simply that there is more to reduce, more 
to translate. 
 The third historical development to enhance the significance of accounting results 
from the interaction of information systems, global markets, and the maturation (or 
perhaps exhaustion) of monetarist economics and its enactment through financial (rather 
than physical) capitalism.  Monetarist economics and financial capital are the post-
Keynesian phenomena that shifted capital’s attention toward the largely linguistic, 
perhaps simulacral, financial markets.  Trading in “risks” rather than physical capital 
became quite efficient due to the fact that much of the labor within the production of 
information systems involved the construction of algorithms designed to rather 
instantaneously exploit financial “signs” (many of them accounting signs) in order to 
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produce “profits” autolegitimated and enforceable independently of any regard for goods 
and services.  Wall Street is now for mathematicians and physicists. 
 The fourth historical development to enhance the significance of accounting 
results from the fragility and complexity of relations between governments and market 
participants.  That fragility and complexity are descriptive of what Jürgen Habermas 
terms “legitimation crises” that face developed countries.  Such crises have several 
dimensions of relevance to accounting.  The first is based in welfare economics and 
liberal political theory.  States redistribute resources, and tax accounting, cost accounting, 
and financial accounting are the technologies through which resources for redistribution 
are acquired.  As markets become more competitive (and efficient), the greater the need 
for market participants to retain resources.  At the same time, enhanced competitiveness 
economically disenfranchises some citizens.  That disenfranchisement increases the need 
for states to acquire resources to preserve both the natural rights of citizens of 
democracies as well as the political legitimacy of the state itself.  Nowhere within the 
natural rights postures of Western liberal political theory and the constitutions derived 
from it are the rights of citizenship tied to the economic productivity or status of the 
citizens themselves.  That’s irrelevant now; global commerce has seen to that.  Other 
state-related responses include “privatizing” what were public assets and services, 
shifting the focus of their own agencies more toward economic efficiency, shifting the 
realities of citizenship either toward more strict or more lax notions.  The strictness 
relates to decreasing welfare expenditures; the laxity relates to enhancing productivity.  
[The current immigration debates in the U.S. Congress are a striking example of cutting 
both ways].  Examples of state responses include the “New Public Management” in the 
United Kingdom and the “National Performance Review” in the United States.  States 
continue to seek as well to reconstitute the notion of citizenship itself in ways oriented 
toward “the efficient state” and “the efficient citizen,” the latter strikingly illustrated by 
shifts in education away from Enlightenment and toward skills, even for four-year-olds.  
Such reconfigurations of institutions and notions of citizenship have been accompanied 
by and indeed made possible by the increasing “accountingization” and “auditability” of 
things, irrespective of whether or not the “metrics” have any meaning or indeed any 
mathematical properties.   Lastly, governments find themselves in a quandary caused by 
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the economic imperative to assist the private sector just as that sector creates the very 
“crises” of citizenship that the state exists to prevent in the first place.  They often behave 
in ways that sacrifice public economic welfare to putatively sustain political legitimacy 
for a somewhat duped public.4 
 If indeed “accountingization” is an accoutrement to globalization, then it is best 
understood as the discursive practice best positioned to continue to do what it has done 
for a couple of centuries – embed the structural imperatives of efficiency and profitability 
in a language capable of subsuming agency within the telos of those particular values.  
The only difference is that globalization ratchets up the stakes and speeds up the velocity 
with which the mandate to efficiency and profitability corrodes other values central to the 
emancipatory pathos of critical theory.  There has to be hope; we are not yet slaves to 
either structures or to the values which gird those structures.  That hope resides in a moral 
ontology of language oriented toward the production of meaning, not merely toward 
information.  With faith that the term will self-destruct after this essay, I will use the term 
“worldizations” to orient the conclusion of this essay toward possibilities for meanings 
which offer potential for a more human sense of what it means to live globally. 
 
Worldizations 
It is interesting to consider what we might be talking about if we had never bought into a 
rhetoric of globalization but instead opted for a concept like  worldization.  Agnes Heller 
(1990) can guide us here. Structures and systems cannot make worlds; worlds cannot be 
“-ized” (and I do so here despite that fact).  That “un-izability” is true because: 
‘World’ is not the sum total of lifeless and living things but the meaning of all 
those things, and meanings are constituted by humans because humans are the 
only bodies tied to  all other bodies – including non-human bodies – by meaning.  
(Heller, 1990, p. 31). 
 
                                                 
4 A good example is the now normal way in which governments offer tax concessions 
and economic incentives to attract new business.  This makes no decision-theoretic or 
statistical sense.  A business seeking a subsidy need only solicit “bids” from a number of 
governments.  The distribution of bids should reflect a range of prices, some perhaps 
profitable and some certainly unprofitable for the citizens.  The business will take the 
largest concession.  It is a statistical truism that the probability that this is a bad economic 
deal for the citizens is extremely high.  The evidence bears that truism out..  
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 Globalization and accountingization are conditions of social regulation, and 
tensions emerge as these conditions do not flow smoothly into the conditions of social 
regulation to which we have grown accustomed (rights, political structures, proximal 
rather than distal understandings of work and economy) (see Heller, 1990, Chapter 1).  
Yet now as with the past humans have discursive and lifeworld resources with which to 
“manage” shifting modes of social regulation.  Indeed, even at the level of structures 
(global capital, transnational institutions, the Internet, accounting systems for example), 
the constitution of meaning as a public, social phenomenon is the only ontological 
possibility.  And, as social regulation becomes more complex in character and scope, as it 
does now, an embrace of Bartelson’s “horizon of expectations,” of “transcendence” 
seems more promising than nostalgia over some historically “fixed” meaning.  Using the 
metaphor of “umbilical cords” as connecting us to each other in a way such that 
socialization through meaning gets fed through them, Heller explains how a surplus of 
meaning can emerge from the multiplicity of human relations now coextensive with the 
singularity of our global, structural embeddedness: 
The more heterogeneous the [social] regulations, the greater the range of options 
for rendering meaning; the greater the range of options for rendering meaning, the 
more numerous the differentiations of shared meanings, the greater the variety 
within the bundle of umbilical cords binding the Self to a particular world; and, 
the greater the variety in the bundle of umbilical cords, the more individualized 
Selves may become.  Yet, as discussed, there can be cords in the bundle of single 
Selves which cannot be connected – or at least comfortably connected – to the 
meaning offered by standing [social] regulations.  Selves can also seek for 
meaning which has not yet been ‘provided’, thus creating a cultural surplus 
(Heller, 1990, pp. 26-27). 
 
When Bartelson appeals for notions of globalization as transcendence, as 
something that opens possibilities for the political imagination, the appeal is for a cultural 
surplus of meaning, a surplus perhaps not yet well “networked,” well “embedded” in the 
bundle.  The transference and transformation metaphors of globalization and its 
discursive offspring accountingization not only create networks of meaning, of social 
regulation; they give rise to other discourses of meaning that actualize the cultural surplus 
made possible by them.  Some of those discourses carry critical, emancipatory force 
through finer differentiations that reveal the economic, political, social, and indeed 
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ethical pathologies of globalization and accountingization.  Some ideas about this surplus 
are suggested below. 
The very informational structures that fuel globalization and accountingization 
carry disruptive potential for them.  While global information systems yield structures 
that conceal the imperialism within them, they also proliferate democratic and popular  
participation in the exchange of meanings which reveals much about that imperialism.  
24/7 global news media, the Internet, and an almost costless connectivity through a range 
of digital communication media have yielded countless and quite powerful examples of 
forces that work corrosively against imperialism.  Capital itself now must cope with what 
I will term “equity populism.”  The same enhancements to capital market efficiency that 
facilitate the flow of institutional capital have produced a new kind of polity – individuals 
directly controlling their own capital while armed with instantaneous access to messages 
and meanings about the management of that capital.  Enron is a perfect example.  I don’t 
think that there has ever been as rapid a response on the part of elites to the demands of 
the public.  Transnational organizations like the IMF and the World Bank are another 
example, as even their former directors come to spill the beans about their incompetence 
and global destructiveness (see Stiglitz, 1992).  Publicity about the socially profane 
activities of multinational corporations with regard to labor and the Earth is ubiquitous, as 
is, to recall Bauman, the complicity of governments as “…executors and plenipotentiaries 
of forces which they have no hope of controlling politically.” The way in which the 
political preferences of the American public have shifted so dramatically because of Iraq 
has much to do with deep and widespread beliefs about capital’s “interests” at work in 
the Oval Office (or even better in the office of the Vice-President/Halliburton).  Those 
interests once flew sufficiently below the radar of the public to remain protected by 
ideological differences.  Such ideological differences like “the Left” and “the Right” now 
dissolve in the concreteness of disclosure about the facts.  To get a bit playful, and to 
avoid iterating through numerous other examples, perhaps we can say that if Habermas 
can locate Modernity in “the structural transformation of the public sphere,” maybe we 
are beginning to witness a properly Postmodern “public transformation of the structural 
sphere,” one made possible by the limit condition of the structures themselves and the 
proliferation of information/meanings that seep from them globally. 
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“Accountingization” need not be attributed just to the conventional discourse of 
accounting – its axiological commitment to efficiency and profitability, its grammar, its 
calculi, its systems and its institutions.  Modes of economic accounting emerge at the 
margins of convention, as humans find new things to talk about with respect to their 
economic connectedness in a global context.  Inasmuch as globalization reconnects the 
political and the economic, it helps us overcome the theoretical and practical opposition 
between them that has defined most of the history of the social sciences.  As Smith 
explains, this is a horizon for new discourses which drive the political (and social) 
through rather than around the economic: 
Given what seems to be the inexorability of economic accounting in and 
throughout every aspect of human – and not only human – existence, from the 
base of the base to the tip of the superstructure, and given also that its operations 
implicate each of us in loss, cost, debt, death and other continuous or ultimate 
reckonings, it is understandable that the dream of an escape from economy should 
be so sweet and the longing for it so pervasive and recurrent.  Since it does appear 
to be inescapable, however, the better, that is, more effective, more profitable, 
alternative would seem to be not to seek to go beyond economy but to do the best 
we can going through . . . (Smith, p. 17). 
 
 Such “new” discourses might include reconstruals of accounting and extensions 
of “accountingizations.”  They need not commit to a language of prices (costs) nor to the 
grammar of accounting.  They may embrace the entanglements and complexities of 
globalization yet retain the local and proximal telos of rendering life in a globalized 
world meaningful as revealed through the activity of giving accounts.  The 
ethnomethodological work of Jönsson (1998) comes to mind as he analyzes managerial 
conversations in which formal structures of accounting control are commingled with 
other claims and counterclaims grounded in functional demands of work, in norms and 
rules, and in economic crises not unrelated to globalization.  In a similar vein, Roberts 
(1991) promotes a mode of organizational discourse that he terms “socializing 
accountability” that is worth a current look in the context of globalization as it is likely to 
reveal specific responses to distant influences.  Arrington and Francis (1993) locate 
economic accounts in the context of the hermeneutics of distanciation in a way that 
provides insight into how the construction of meaning – “… a general need for making 
our own what is foreign to us” (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 73) – is conditioned by the spatial and 
 14
temporal horizons across which discourse is addressed.  These and other similar 
examples of research share one thing in common – they are focused on how meaning 
(worlds) emerge through economic accounts. 
Another approach to the economic account focuses upon the regulative ideals that 
might make the production of meaning “rational” and the veracity of meaning legitimate.  
Part of the crisis tendencies of globalization have to do with suspicions about the 
adequacy of the regulative ideals embedded within liberal political theory and modern 
philosophy to provide legitimacy, as customary senses of reason, justice, democracy and 
virtue reveal their dark side throughout the globe.  Without doubt, some neo-liberals have 
seized the moment by filling this empty space – this darkness of moral/political givens -- 
with a new economism in which social and political life lives under a heteronomy of the 
rationality of self-interested pursuits.  Economic self-interest thus becomes the lynchpin 
of “managing everything” – people, markets, organizations, states, and world affairs, 
often in an amoral and “game-theoretic” way.  Meaning (and thereby worlds) thus 
becomes purely strategic, and economic accounts are instruments placed in the service of 
strategic interests.  With less success than the neoliberals, others working from within 
Frankfurt-inspired critical social theory have sought to relocate rationality and the 
veracity of meaning in communicative norms that, if enacted, would ground decisions 
and actions in a generalized public interest.  “Managing” thus becomes a process of 
securing the practical conditions for a discourse that would be norm-conformative.  
Primarily influenced by Jürgen Habermas’ work, much research has focused on the 
economic account as located in this space of communicative rationality.  It is an 
important antidote to the economism of neoliberals who seem to be, sadly, carrying the 
academic and practical day on “how to manage things,” at least in the United States.  
Both the economistic neoliberals and the Habermasians are exploiting the transcendent 
potential that emerges from globalization (see Habermas, 1990, 1999 for examples of his 
own articulation of the relevance of his work to the problems of globalization).   
Globalization carries potential for meaning, for worlds, that aren’t easily 
anticipated through the conventional protocols of the theorists.  John Dewey was correct 
in the claim that “humans have the dumb pluck of animals,” and the dark side of 
globalization has no more of a chance against that pluck than did any of the numerous 
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threats to human dignity that have defined us historically.  The horizon of discourse and 
the meanings-to-be-produced in a global world will be novel and varied; yet, whatever 
their shape and character, the economic account will be ubiquitous within them.  Such 
accounts are an important part of the answer to the question of who we are: 
. . . the most basic distinction of all embedded in our discourse and our practice . . 
. is that between human beings and other beings.  Human beings can be held to 
account for that of which they are the authors; other beings cannot.  To identify an 
occurrence as an action is in the paradigmatic instances to identify it under a type 
of description which enables us to see that occurrence as flowing intelligibly from 
a human agent’s intentions, motives, passions and purposes.  It is therefore to 
understand an action as something for which someone is accountable, about 
which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible account 
(MacIntyre, 1984, p. 209). 
 
This will persist, and maybe the tables of power will be turned. 
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